

was urged to do by Colonel Warren (see his report), the enemy must have been overtaken, perhaps at the Baltimore Store, or at any rate before he could have crossed the Chickahominy.

Major Williams states that the enemy could not have passed the point where he struck the Hanover road more than an hour before he reached there.

Captain Royall wished me to state that he had verbal orders to resist any force which might approach his position. This was in addition to the written instructions from General Williams.

In reference to the movements of General Emory's command in pursuit I learned nothing more than what was contained in his report and in the report of Colonel Rush, except as to the movements conducted by Maj. R. Morris, whose report I inclose.

It may not be improper for me to state that the officers of the Fifth Cavalry evinced some discontent because they had been made to turn in their carbines.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. B. CLITZ,  
Major, Twelfth Infantry.

Capt. FRED. T. LOCKE,  
Assistant Adjutant-General, General Porter's Corps.

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No. 4.

*Reports of Brig. Gen. Philip St. George Cooke, U. S. Army, commanding Cavalry Reserve, of operations June 13-14.*

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,  
June 15, 1862.

GENERAL: The 13th instant, while in the act of writing to inform you of the change of position to Gaines' Mill, from whence I could draw green forage from the fields and meadows of the Chickahominy, and which I had ordered, I received a report by an officer from Captain Royall of the enemy having attacked him in large force. I immediately sounded "To horse," and ordered six squadrons of Emory's brigade to re-enforce him, and reported the facts to the nearest division commander, Brigadier-General Sykes, who sent me a brigade of infantry, under Colonel Warren, of the Zouaves, and Weed's battery of artillery. As I marched with these forces and my remaining cavalry (six squadrons being on this occasion taken from me) an officer, Lieutenant Byrnes, in the affair with Royall, reported that he had seen from three to five regiments of infantry, also artillery.

I joined the advance of my cavalry at Old Hanover Court-House about 10 o'clock in advance of the infantry, when I went on soon after to Old Church. I received at that time various orders from various persons to "hold my own and maintain my position;" to "watch carefully in front and rear;" "not attack a superior force," &c.

The enemy was supported by infantry, no doubt. His force was, in addition, one or two brigades of cavalry, with some artillery. I followed his trail at daydawn yesterday, sometimes on two roads, to Tunstall's Station, having found that the White House depot was safe. I arrived there about 9 o'clock. General Emory sending from there Rush's Lancers in pursuit; his following him with a regiment of infantry and a section of Weed's battery and my marching to join these

forces in the afternoon with the cavalry; the escape of the enemy beyond the Chickahominy, announced at that moment, were all reported at their occurrence. The heat was excessive, but the troops all bore it, together with the entire absence of baggage, very scant food, and night marching, with praiseworthy indifference and alacrity.

I will observe that this is the second pressing occasion in which Brigadier-General Emory has been taken away from his brigade.

My command all marched back this morning, the cavalry to Gaines' Mill, where I had ordered the baggage train to meet me, but found it had been ordered back to this old camp by General Porter; and from here I am instructed to move toward Old Church.

Whenever a thousand or two of cavalry under a bold leader has it in its power to get in rear of the army, to make a dash on its communications and depots, if it follow on the heels of the pickets into a camp of equal force, whether of light cavalry or cavalry reserve, it may chance to destroy it; and in this connection I would suggest a necessary precaution of safety on the flanks or rear of the army; that the inhabitants should be confined or restricted to their homesteads.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. ST. GEO. COOKE,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.*

P. S.—I am unable to forward a report of the scout ordered to Hanover Court-House, &c., on the 12th, in consequence of the absence of its commander, Captain Gregg, Sixth Cavalry, who I learn returned, and has been ordered somewhere. I have not yet received a report from Captain Royall, who is badly wounded.

Respectfully,

P. ST. GEO. COOKE,  
*Brigadier-General.*

Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY, *Chief of Staff.*

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HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY RESERVE,  
*June 16, 1862—1.30 p. m.*

SIR: I have just received the reports of the officers connected with the attack on Captain Royall. My present duties make it impossible to connect them in a narrative report of mine at present, as your communication requires, so I herewith inclose them. I only add that Captain Royall's instructions were the original ones from the Headquarters of the Army.

I will make the report of the march to Captain Royall's relief and the pursuit of the enemy as soon as I have time. Every moment of this day has been occupied by more pressing duties.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. ST. GEO. COOKE,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.*

Capt. FRED. T. LOCKE,  
*Asst. Adjt. Gen., Fifth Provisional Army Corps.*

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HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY RESERVE,  
*Camp near New Bridge, June 17, 1862.*

SIR: I report my operations on the 13th and 14th instant:

Captain Royall, Fifth Cavalry, was ordered, with two squadrons, to Old Church, May 31, to remain until relieved, under instructions of

General Williams, assistant adjutant-general, with the addition that he was to report anything important to me.

At 3 or 4 o'clock Friday, the 13th, Lieutenant Watkins galloped to my quarters and reported hastily that Captain Royall had been attacked and overpowered. He had escaped the enemy through the woods. I received a strong impression—I do not remember his words—that the enemy was close upon my camp. I immediately ordered the cavalry alarm "To horse" to be sounded, and sent an order to General Emory to take or send six squadrons of the Fifth and Sixth Cavalry, which were all of these regiments present, to support Royall or meet the enemy. I forwarded the report, to the best of my recollection, to General Sykes, as the nearest division commander. These regiments were soon off, General Emory informing me that he had ordered Major Williams to command them. Looking for Rush's regiment of Lancers a few moments after, I found they had gone, and also General Emory. I supposed he had considered himself authorized to take them, and marched over to a field in rear of my camp toward the enemy with the First Cavalry, and found near there General Emory and Colonel Rush's regiment. I ordered them to positions until something more certain could be ascertained. Then information began to come in—a report from Major Williams that he had found the enemy in great force between him and Royall's position; one or two of Captain Royall's men, who reported they had retreated or escaped by the Cold Harbor road; Lieutenant Byrnes, who had been in the attack, who reported he had seen about five regiments of the enemy's infantry; also a staff officer informed me that Colonel Warren was coming with a brigade of infantry and a foot battery of artillery to report to me.

About this time I received various dispatches from General Porter, also from General Sykes, some of which I had anticipated. One from General Porter to "notify General Emory and all troops near me." Another "that he should like to see me at his headquarters, if I could leave my command, at 8 o'clock; also General Emory." I then sent through General Emory, I believe, an order to Major Williams to hold his position, that re-enforcements were coming, to collect information, &c., and sent by General Emory the information received and dispatch to General Porter.

I then ordered forward Colonel Warren, and finding that the cavalry, from the great suddenness of the movement, were without rations of forage, I sent the First Cavalry and Rush's regiment a short distance to their camp, with orders to remedy it and the First to move forward in about two hours, and requested General Emory to send forward a wagon of provisions to his brigade, which was done, and returned to my tent to get a cup of coffee, not being well and having had a long ride in the morning since taking food. I soon received an order from General Porter to send four squadrons of Rush's cavalry to report to General Sykes, which I immediately ordered or communicated (its fifth squadron had been sent forward as a picket on a road leading toward Hanover), with the copy of a dispatch from general headquarters to me to obey General Porter's orders.

Then, about dusk, I moved forward. I passed Colonel Warren's brigade within about 2 miles, and joined Major Williams at the cross of the Hanover road about 10 p. m. Found he had a picket a mile out at a defensible bridge over the Totopotomoy and a platoon. At first I thought to move in the direction the enemy had taken at Old Church, and could get no reliable information as to the enemy's strength or whether he had much infantry. Soon Colonel Warren arrived and

made me a sketch of the country in the immediate vicinity and toward New Castle. I sent him on to Old Church, with directions to send forward the cavalry to the New Castle fork of the road, just as his rear regiment, the Zouaves, passed. I sent to recall it, thinking to leave it to cover my rear on moving, and ordered its commander to send a company to occupy the bridge over the Totopotomoy at dawn of day to relieve the cavalry there—all but five men. Afterward I changed my mind, and about 2 o'clock ordered the regiment to move forward to rejoin the brigade at 3 o'clock. (I don't know by what misunderstanding or fault or by whom the company had been ordered to the bridge and not relieved when the regiment marched but overtook the regiment at Old Church before it marched, but I believe very soon after the proper time for its march to come.)

But to resume in order. I then received every few moments dispatches or orders—one informing me that "General Sykes has been directed to assume command of your force and to join you early in the morning with a large infantry force and artillery. He will also send you instructions." Another from General Porter, which I marked "Received 11.10," desiring me to "bring all the information concerning the enemy you (I) can get hold of." Another, marked "Received 11.20," desiring me to "hold my own, and maintain your (my) position. Do not attack a superior force," &c.; informing me that "General Emory had been ordered to Tunstall's Station with four squadrons;" directing me to "send two squadrons to report to General Sykes as soon as possible."

About midnight Major Doull came to me from Colonel Warren with information (for which he stated they had from previous acquaintance there peculiar facilities) that the enemy was believed to be within a mile and a quarter, near the New Castle fork of the road, beyond which I was informed there was but one road below in a pretty open country, and was so confident of it that Colonel Warren had not sent there the cavalry picket as he had been requested. Then the major kindly wrote by moonlight a dispatch for General Sykes, in substance that I had hopes to strike the enemy there at daylight, and then or later, I forget which, mentioned that the information of infantry force with the enemy was not confirmed. Perhaps too strongly expressed, I meant I could get no new information as to it. I gave orders for a march at 3 o'clock. But soon after a teamster, Private Blanchard, First Cavalry, arrived and reported to me the circumstances of the enemy's attack on the trains before sundown the previous day at Garlick's Landing; afterward another teamster. They had just come over the road where the enemy was supposed to be, and I knew that he could not be there.

Leaving, then, only a platoon of cavalry to cover my rear at the bridge over the Totopotomoy, I marched between 3 and 4 a. m., and soon joined Colonel Warren at Old Church. I intended at first to leave him at the New Castle road, where there was no larger river road, but I changed my mind and marched on with my whole command, sending a dispatch to General Sykes that I left the rear toward Hanover Court-House to his care, &c.

My dispatch in the night informed General Sykes that the orders to "maintain my position," &c., could not be considered as binding. At the moment I felt confident of a fine opportunity at daylight, and naturally I was strongly tempted to take that view of all information that would authorize me not to await a successor in command, and I had been sent word that General Sykes would march at 3 o'clock.

The whole affair now was very simple. The enemy was invariably reported from 1,000 to 2,000 cavalry, some artillery. An officer had seen their infantry. No one was positive he had none. If the enemy returned over the road, as was then believed he would, I should soon meet him. I had under 500 cavalry; if he had no infantry, I should need the infantry for anything like certain success. If the enemy did not return I know he had been 8 miles or more ahead ten hours before at least, so that cavalry alone could not overtake him, even if it should pursue to attack three times its strength in numbers, supported by artillery. (Mine was not horse artillery.)

I expected, then, to meet him every moment, or, if he had infantry and attacked White House depot, that General Emory and a few other troops I supposed might be there would detain him until I should fall upon him with my force of three arms. The infantry marched as fast as possible. The day proved excessively warm, and they and the artillery suffered. Near Garlick's it became certain that White House depot had not been attacked, and the enemy's motions could only be guessed. The cavalry got well ahead, with orders to halt at Tunstall's Station. Colonel Warren I authorized to halt at the first water near there. I joined the cavalry there soon after their arrival; found General Emory, and learned the enemy had been traced far southward. He marched to support Colonel Rush soon after my arrival with infantry, and I promised to overtake him with my cavalry, with which, after a necessary rest, I knew I could do at 3 o'clock, but with the least hope in the world of overtaking retreating cavalry with the start I knew he had. Accordingly I commenced to march at 3 o'clock, and just then received a dispatch from General Emory, 4 or 5 miles off, I believe at Baltimore Cross-Roads, that the enemy had escaped over the Chickahominy, and at the same moment another from Colonel Rush, 13 or 14 miles off, to the same effect. I bivouacked, and returned early next morning, the 15th.

I inclose the reports of Brigadier-General Emory, Colonels Blake, Rush, and Grier, Major Williams, Captain Whiting, and Lieutenant Hoyer.

Very respectfully,

P. ST. GEO. COOKE,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.*

Capt. FRED. T. LOCKE,  
*Asst. Adjt. Gen., Fifth Provisional Army Corps.*

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HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,  
*Camp on Cold Harbor Road, June 19, 1862.*

SIR: I returned the 15th instant from forty-eight hours' hard duty in the hottest weather of the season, getting no sleep for thirty-six hours, to receive after dark long orders about every half hour chiefly regarding a new duty of picketing 10 or 12 miles about the same distance off; making large detachments at midnight, and next day, after six or seven hours, constantly receiving, considering, and sending dispatches to out parties, Major Clitz called on me with the astonishing communication that he was sent to investigate some parts of my conduct. The reports had been ordered to be sent in that morning, which was impossible. Under these trying circumstances I wrote hastily a statement, which (Major Clitz not returning next morning) I sent in as a report. Thus

I made an important omission, which I must supply, and recapitulate the main facts.

About 3.30 p. m. I had in camp six squadrons of the Fifth and Sixth Cavalry (about 240 men), First Cavalry, and the Lancers. An officer coming at full speed made me such a report that I received the impression that "from 3,000 to 5,000" of the enemy were at hand. In about fifteen minutes the Fifth and Sixth Cavalry were sent to the front. The country there consists of swampy woods, narrow roads, and fences where there are openings. Then, as I was taking forward the First Cavalry, a sergeant of the Sixth Cavalry, who had been with Captain Gregg, reported to General Emory that the enemy were on a near road to the left, and a man of the Fifth Cavalry reported to me and to Captain Merritt, aide-de-camp, that the enemy were near at hand, also to the left, driving in infantry pickets, teamsters, &c. Thus my impression was confirmed, and considerable time was spent in getting the Sixth Pennsylvania in a position in a field, and I took the First Cavalry some distance on the road to the left, and waited till some information could be got.

Not long after and together came reports from Captain Royall's command that it had escaped by the Cold Harbor road; from Major Williams that the enemy was in force between him and Royall's position (this dispatch General Emory took to General Porter), and Lieutenant Byrnes, of Royall's command, who had seen from three to five regiments of infantry; and a staff officer, that a brigade of infantry and a battery were at hand to re-enforce me. I sent them forward. Rush's Lancers and half of the First Cavalry were taken from me. I passed the infantry brigade; went to Williams' position and sought information; sent on the brigade when it arrived to Old Church, where there was then a cavalry picket. The first important information I could get was from Colonel Warren, at Old Church, about midnight, that the enemy he believed to be lying about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles in front of him. I made arrangements to attack him at daylight with my whole force. About an hour after I learned with certainty that the enemy was not there, and had been at Garlick's Landing the afternoon before. (Lieutenant Spangler, regimental quartermaster Sixth Cavalry, who was in the neighborhood with a train, states he was there about 4.30 o'clock.)

The average estimate of the enemy's force was about 1,500 cavalry, with artillery certainly. Nothing new was ascertained as to infantry, so the rest is plain. I could not overtake him with cavalry alone, of which I had under 500. If he returned, as was then supposed, I went on at daylight to meet him with my whole force.

Since an investigation has been ordered—known to all the world—I have the right to demand a thorough one, and a publication of the judgment of the case or the complete exoneration by the major-general commanding the army.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. ST. GEO. COOKE,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.*

Brig. Gen. R. B. MARCY,  
*Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac.*